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NOTES
Antitrust Law-Reciprocal Price Information Exchanges
In United States v.Container Corporation of America,1 the United
States Supreme Court held that the exchange among corrugated container
sellers of prices recently charged or quoted to buyers constituted a per se
violation of section one of the Sherman Act.' The Court reasoned that
the effect of the exchanges, in their market setting, had been to keep prices
within a relatively narrow ambit, and that this interference with the price
mechanism in the market was unlawful.
The method used was simple. When a seller was requested by a buyer
to quote a price, he would sometimes ask his competitors who had sold or
quoted prices to that buyer what their prices were or had been. There was
no agreement that the seller seeking the last price or price quote from his
competitor would not undercut it. The exchanges between the defendants
were infrequent and the only compulsion to participate was the natural
one that a seller would not be able to obtain price information from his
competitors if he did not make it available to them. Moreover, industry
prices had not increased despite rising labor and material costs. The
industry, however, was competitive and, but for the exchanges, prices
might have decreased.
Generally the effects of the dissemination of price information are
determined by the economic setting and the type of information, and
thus the Court closely analyzed the economic conditions of the corrugated
container industry. It found that the industry was controlled by a few
dominant4 sellers and that the product was homogeneous. Since each
competitor's product was almost identical, price alone determined sales.
Moreover, each box was individually made to size and shape to fill a
specific order, with no standard unit that competitors could use to make
189 S. Ct. 510 (1969).
'26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
'See generally J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 27-36 (1959), quoted in
H. BLAKE & R. PITOFSKY, ANTITRUST LAW 25-31 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
BLAKE & PITOFSKY]; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 149-50 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as KAYSEN & TURNER]; REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 325-26 (1955).

'For a factual breakdown of the concentration in the industry, see P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 531 (1967).
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a price list. The industry was also characterized by ease of market entry
and inelastic demand and there were competitive pressures from excess
capacity and large buyers. These conditions resulted in uncertainty as to
what sellers would charge and made the exchange of price information
meaningful.
There were four primary factors then in the market situation of the
container industry that served to facilitate interdependent pricing: (1)
the general oligopolistic structure; (2) product homogeneity; (3) excess
tapacity; and (4) inelastic demand. The effect each factor has on the
pricing structure must be understood before a critical appraisal of the
Court's decision can be attempted.
Exchange of price information among oligopolists obviously can be a
potent force for establishing price uniformity. By their nature, oligopolists
must anticipate the reactions of their rivals more closely than participants
in a more "perfectly competitive market," where power is fragmented
and decisions are not based as much on what a seller's rivals are doing
as what the seller himself is capable of doing. Uniformity of action in
the oligopolistic industry is more easily arranged and enforced without
resort to actual agreement. Hence, any agreement is harder to detect
because of this natural tendency towards price uniformity. Proof of combination or conspiracy without actual agreement is also difficult, so assuring
compliance with the antitrust laws by oligopolists necessarily becomes
harder.
Interdependent pricing is further facilitated in industries that produce
homogeneous products. Buyers are not persuaded by attempts at differentiation. Competition in quality or special appeal is eliminated, leaving price
as the only uncertain factor a competitor must consider in anticipating his
rivals' reactions. 5 Homogeneity encourages the tendency not to reduce
prices because the seller knows his reductions will be automatically met
by his competitors. 6
C6operation to defeat the market mechanism is more likely in industries characterized by excess capacity because there is greater incentive
to overcome that adverse economic condition .7 Industries dealing in
products for which there is an inelastic demand facilitate interdependent
pricing because the buyer has to place his order on an immediate need
Adelman, Effective 28.
Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61
1289, 1329 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Adelman].
"89 S. Ct. at 513 n.4. See also Adelman 1328.
BLAKE & PITOFSKY
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basis.' Price changes would, therefore, neither increase nor decrease
demand. Thus, there is less pressure to cut prices.
There are economic factors in the box industry that might have retarded the otherwise natural tendency towards oligopolistic interdependent
pricing: (1) ease of market entry, (2) high fixed costs, and (3) an individualized product. Ease of market entry generally diminishes the
effectiveness of oligopolists' efforts to maintain noncompetitive pricing.
If entry does not require a large investment and large profits are prevalent,
new businessmen are attracted to the industry and the oligopolists' share
of the market and their profits are thus reduced.9 But even this characteristic was turned against the defendants in Container Corporation.
New entrants were indeed attracted to the industry,' despite its excess
capacity. Businessmen, however, would not normally invest in an industry
with excess capacity unless there were some special attraction to do sofor example, an unusually high rate of return. The Court could thus
infer that the defendants' activities had operated to maintain prices at
a normally unexpected level and thus attracted the new entrants. Furthermore, although new entrants usually cause periods of price instability
in any market, 1 the Court noted that prices in the container industry had
remained relatively stable. These two factors indicated that there was
some outside force operating to stabilize prices and contributed to the
"irresistable inference" that the exchanges of price information had an
anticompetitive effect."
High fixed costs of operation (as opposed to low initial capital
investment) can also have a detrimental effect on noncompetitive oligopoly
pricing. In industries with high fixed costs, sales gains give an extra boost
to profits because the overhead cost can be spread over the expanding sales.
Where the commodity is homogeneous, however, sales gains can be
achieved only through off-list selling, secret rebates and other devices by
which prices are secretly cut. The incentive to use these devices becomes
even greater when high fixed costs are coupled with excess capacity as in
the corrugated container industry. The individualized nature of the
product can make price cuts more difficult to detect and therefore en' Brief for Appellant at 28, United States v. Container Corp. of America, 89 S.
Ct. 510 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
' BLAKE & PIToFsxY 29-30.
1089 S. Ct. at 512.
"

12

BLAKE & PITOFSKY 31.

See 89 S. Ct. at 512.

-NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

courage departure from noncompetitive pricing. When uncertainty is introduced into the market in this manner, the stability of the oligopolists'
control is disturbed.
However, if complete knowledge of current individual prices offered to
specific customers is introduced into a noncompetitive oligopoly pricing
situation, such as the corrugated container industry, the last doubt as to
a competitor's prices will be eliminated. Incentive to lower prices is
vastly reduced because the seller knows that lowering his prices will only
bring him the same share of the market at a lower return. 13 Price uniformity becomes even more probable. Also eliminated is the buyer's
option to withhold price information, thus injecting additional uncertainty
into the market that might stimulate price competition based on competitors' individual capabilities.14 In no instance has the Court sanctioned
dissemination of information that specifically identified the customer who
received a certain price.' 5
The Supreme Court in the past has not been unaware of the dangers
of co6peration among oligopolists to eliminate those uncertainties in their
markets that undermine interdependent pricing. Sugar Institute, Ite. v.

United States 6 involved a somewhat similar economic situation. The
sugar industry was dominated by a few sellers, and its product was homo-

geneous, but not individualized. Excess capacity and high fixed costs had
led to the use of off-list pricing and secret rebates. The members of the
Institute agreed to abide by published price lists. By eliminating off-list
pricing, the members had removed the only possible uncertainty left in
their market and the tendency towards price uniformity was greatly enhanced. The Court held the agreement violated the Sherman Act.' 7 The
second example of the Court's concern about the elimination of market
'3
14

3

See text at note 6 supra.
Brief for Appellant 34.

" See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) ; American Column
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
& Lumber
10297 U.S. 553 (1936).
', We have noted that the fifteen refiners, represented in the Institute, refine
practically all the imported raw sugar processed in this country. They supply
from 70 to 80 per cent, of the sugar consumed ....

Another outstanding fact

is that defendants' product is a thoroughly standardized commodity. In their
competition, price, rather than brand, is generally the vital consideration ....
The fact that, because sugar is a standardized commodity, there is a strong
tendency to uniformity of price, makes it the more important that such opportunities as may exist for fair competition should not be impaired.
Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
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uncertainties to implement noncompetitive pricing is found in its decisions
in the basing point system cases.' Again the industries involved were
characterized by excess capacity, high overhead and a standardized product
that encouraged the use of secret rebates. There were significant price
variations resulting from the varying freight charges. By -refusing to sell
FOB and by quoting railroad freight charges exclusively, the nonequidistant sellers were able to match their competitors' prices more easily.
The purpose of basing point and other similar systems was "to eliminate
a kind of uncertainty that is a potent force disrupting stable noncompetitive oligopoly pricing."19 Basing point systems agreements have been
condemned by the courts as "price fixing."' 20 Both examples indicate that
the Court believes agreements designed to eliminate uncertainty and not
having any dominant proper purpose should be condemned as per se
violations of the antitrust laws. 21 Other attempts to remove the uncertainties remaining in a market by co6perative dissemination of price information have been considered anticompetitive efforts rather than attempts to make competition more effective.2
The defendants in Container Corporation argued that the purpose
of the exchanges was to make competition more effective. Relying on
" FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 696-700, 709-17 (1948) ; Sugar Inst., Inc.
v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 589-93 (1936); Fort Howard Paper Co. v. FTC,
156 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1946); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478
(7th Cir. 1946); United States Maltsters Ass'n v. FTC, 152 F.2d 161 (7th Cir.
1945).
" Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 674 (1962). See also
Adelman 1327-47.
"0See cases cited note 18 supra.
21 See generally KAYSEN & TURNER 150.
But in markets where oligopolistic elements are present, some ignorance and
uncertainty about the behavior of rivals is an important competitive element
in the market, since it prevents "rational" oligopolistic calculation leading to
joint maximization of profits.
Id.
22 See Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1956) (formula
pricing); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952)
(agreed prices); United States v. American Body & Trailer, Inc., CCH 1958 Trade
Cas. 69,063 (W.D. Okla. 1958) ; United States v. Garden State Retail Gas. Dealers
Ass'n, Inc., CCH 1956 Trade Cas. 68,493 (D.N.J. 1956) (agreed list prices);
United States v. Electrical Solderless Serv. Connector Inst., CCH 1940-43 Trade
Cas. 56,081 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison,
Inc., CCH 1940-43 Trade Cas. 56,061 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (estimated prices). Cf.
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (past prices
permissible); Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949);
56,028
United States v. National Container Ass'n, CCH 1940-43 Trade Cas.
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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Cement Manufacturers Protective Association v. United Statesm they
pointed out specifically that the exchanges were an attempt to protect
themselves from buyers who misquoted offers from other competitors.
But their argument can be dismissed on three grounds. First, as the
Court pointed out, the cases are factually distinguishable. 24 In Cement
the sellers exchanged information as to what orders had been filled to
protect themselves from fraudulent inducements to deliver more cement
than a contractor needed for a specific job. The defendants in Container
Corporationhad no legal right to get the correct price from the buyers.
No tort had been committed by the buyers. Second, the defendants already
had manuals which enabled them to calculate their competitors' prices, 2 and
if they did not want to sell at as low a profit margin as their competitors,
they did not have to. Third, it is now clear that the Court does not condone conspiracy to overcome competitive evils, or unethical conduct on the
part of competitors or customers who use methods that would otherwise
be per se violations of the antitrust laws.2"
The Supreme Court's finding that the exchanges constituted a violation of the antitrust laws is not surprising. Past precedent supported if not
compelled the outcome. The application of the per se rules was, however,
an additional stepY Generally, the application of a per se rule depends
upon a finding that the activity usually has bad effects, that good effects
are rarely present and hard to prove, and that there is thus little need to
examine effects or invite litigation over them. The per se rule is applied
when the Court feels that the defendant should not be allowed to deny
that which logic and experience indicate is the principle purpose of the
activity. The difference between gains and losses from making conduct
per se illegal28 and the concomitant administrative advantages must justify
23268 U.S. 588 (1925).
2"89 S. Ct. at 511.
25 Id. at

512.
"Fashion Orig. Guild of Amer., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
"'The per se rule was not applied in Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 563 (1925); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923);
American Colunm & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
" Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) ; International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); Fashion Orig.
Guild of Amer., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (tying clauses).
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any arbitrariness involved.2 9 In Container Corporation,the gain derived
from making the price exchanges illegal was the elimination of a method
used by already powerful oligopolists to remove one of the last obstacles
to noncompetitive pricing in a market ideally receptive to such pricing.
The oligopolists are denied a method by which they could interfere with
the independent operation of the price mechanism.30 Against this gain
must be balanced any loss of potential benefit. The defendants do lose an
easy method of determining which of their customers are misquoting prices
to them. But since sellers are supposed to make independent decisions as
to price based on their own costs and capabilities, this loss seems insignificant. 31
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Marshall asserted that the per seirrule
should not be applied because the ease of market entry in the box industry
would preclude the success of any anticompetitive activities. 32 His approach seems unrealistic for several reasons. First, competitors would
still be controlling prices within the margins set by both the competitive
price and by what they could get noncompetitively without inducing entry.
Second, there is a lag between the time prices get high enoi-gll'tt"i'duice
f
di
l
entry and the time the entry actually takes place. Competit6'Wb
manipulation, may exploit this time lag to make profits, t, en?, cut prices
back in time to discourage new entry. Third, why shbuld, the Cpurt
when
depend on the second line defense of the economic mechanism,
If-t
F.[UI
Jthe
,
activity is unlawful? Fourth, the pressures created by, ease Of market
entry are more than counterbalanced by the factors -facilitating interdependent pricing. Fifth and last, the finding by the majority that price
competition had been held within a narrow ambit despite new entries into
:)' ,(
4
)I
4f~I tq
the market indicate that Mr. Justice Marshall's hoped for effects had' not
e uicy m
and would not take place. New entrants would realize a
ers, would
lowe
the industry of buyers splitting orders among
f
the
mnat
a a lower
their
same
share
result in their maintaining
i,
ri - l
; .
.V)S i I,
return.
relatiye
clarity,
,sefof
per
se
rules,
are,
three
The administrative advantages
enforcement, and less need for litigation to actiieve' a given evel 0 enorcement.
b!'r1 o;cdl fr,
, Mil
KAYSEN & TURNER 142-43.
"Irrefutable precedent for the application of the per se rule for that purpose
iuifil'Oil Co.,
is found in the famous footnote 59 to United States v. Socon V
abllable
310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940), the language dfirhidh' ud i6'1V
:?,'. 111
"r '°'/U
0 yw-'
' ":
to this case.
3
Container Corporation repreiiited -af ekclen op fftiiyfdr t'1t.6,uQdrt.to
set down its policy. This was not a treble damage suit afale' d fendants' did not
0
,
stand to lose financially.
1289 S. Ct. at 515 (dissenting opinion).
-fll
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Container Corporation indicates that the Supreme Court is acutely
aware of the economic setting in which the cooperative activities of businessmen take place. The Court is particularly insistent that oligopolists,
because of the tremendous control they already have over the market,
the natural tendency to price uniformity in oligopolistic industries, and
the advantageous position they are in to defeat the competitive processes,
not be allowed to remove any of the uncertainties that prevent them from
obtaining even firmer control of the market. The corrugated container
industry was ideally conducive to oligopolistic manipulation, except for
the uncertainty created by the individualized nature of the product. The
exchanges of price information eliminated that uncertainty. The Supreme
Court was unwilling to allow the defendants, already rich in power, that
additional luxury.
BEN F. TENNILLE

Arbitration-The Arbitrator's Duty to Disclose Past Business
Relationships With a Party
"[W] here your treasure is, there will your heart be also."' This generally recognized element of human nature-that a man will be partial toward his own self-interest-is the reason for the rule that "no man shall
be a judge in his own cause." 2 Acceptance of society's insistence that
disputes among its members be resolved through the use of a judicial
process, rather than through the use of violence or other forms of "selfhelp," depends to a great extent on the evident fairness and impartiality
of the judicial system.3 In the leading case of Tuiney v. Ohio,4 the
Supreme Court held that it was a violation of due process to subject a
defendant's liberty or property "to the judgment of a court the judge of
which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case." 5 In Tumey, the defendant was tried
and convicted by the village mayor, who received additional compensation
from all those tried by him only if they were found guilty. The Supreme
'Matthew
6:21.
'Dr. Bonham's
Case, 8 Co. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).
'See Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in THE HAYDEN
COLLOQUIUM ON SCIENTIFIC CONCEPT AND METHOD

'273 U.S. 510 (1927).
rId.at 523.

51-56 (1958).

